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 Purpose: The main goal of the paper is to establish the importance of capital mobility for the 
occurrence of the credit booms in some EMU countries, which contributed to the so-called 
Eurozone crisis in the previous decade. In particular, a causal relationship between foreign 
capital inflows and expansions of credit to the private sector in five advanced “periphery” 
Eurozone economies (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain) in 1996–2016 is examined. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: A threshold method for identifying credit booms, and the 
Granger causality test were applied to investigate the relationship between foreign capital 
inflows and expansion of credit to the private sector in the PIIGS countries. We used data of 
an annual frequency over the years 1996–2016 and discuss the effects of using different 
measures for both capital inflows and credit expansion. 
Findings: The results allowed the authors to identify and measure credit booms in the PIIGS 
countries from 2006 to 2011. It has been shown that one of the reasons for the over-
indebtedness of households and companies in these countries was the inflow of cheap and 
easily accessible capital, especially in the form of portfolio investments. 
Practical Implications: The results of the research can be used to assess the importance of the 
free movement of capital for financial stability in Eurozone countries. 
Originality/Value: The study contributes to a better understanding of the functioning of the 
Economic and Monetary Union as regards the links between capital flows in the financial 
market and the emergence of credit booms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The free movement of capital was envisaged back in the Treaty of Rome as one of the 
four freedoms of the Single European Market (SEM), in addition to the free movement 
of the labour force, goods and services. This freedom, however, was not introduced 
as quickly as, for example, liberalisation of the movement of goods. As no binding 
deadlines were agreed, it took a long time before the free movement of capital was 
implemented. The member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) were 
afraid to open their economies to an uncontrolled movement of funds (Janicka, 2006). 
The breakthrough came with the adoption of Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 
June 1988 which established a schedule of full liberalisation of capital movements 
within the Community. Under this directive, the member states were obliged to 
implement full liberalisation of the movement of capital as of 1 July 19903. 
 
Liberalisation of capital movement should contribute to the smooth functioning of the 
SEM, supplementing the other abovementioned freedoms. It should also boost 
economic progress, making possible effective capital investments and promoting the 
euro as an international currency, which strengthens the position of the EU as an 
international exchange partner. Besides this, it was necessary for the development of 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the euro. 
 
The free movement of capital between countries means that entities from these 
countries can freely make international payments to any account, resulting from both 
the current and capital transactions (Oręziak, 1999b). In consequence, all entities 
operating in the European Union, have gained full freedom to ‘move’ and transfer 
funds, which includes, for example, making payments for goods and services, making 
investments, and the free transfer of assets to other member states. Thus, the free 
movement of capital should enable, inter alia: direct investments, purchase and sale 
of real estate in other member states, purchase and sale of securities and transactions 
involving them, taking loans, granting loans, sureties and guarantees as well as 
personal capital flows. 
 
The abovementioned benefits from the liberalisation of capital mobility do not always 
occur in practice. Moreover, the liberalisation of capital movements may also bring 
risks, in particular in the case of less competitive countries. Large capital inflows 
could trigger an excessive, sharp increase in credit to the private sector, and in macro- 
and micro-fluctuations or even in financial crises (Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; 
Arena et al., 2015). Although this phenomenon is observed more frequently in 
developing and low-income countries, it may also occur in advanced economies 
(Hernandez and Landerretche, 2002). Thus, the purpose of the study is to determine 
the significance of capital mobility for the occurrence of credit booms in some EMU 
countries, which contributed to the so-called Eurozone crisis in the previous decade. 
 
3Four countries, i.e. Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, were granted a transition period 
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The countries that were most affected by the financial crisis of 2007+ were selected 
for in-depth analysis, namely: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain (referred to 
as the PIIGS countries). The research hypotheses assume that, in the period of 1996–
2016, foreign capital inflows contributed to excessive expansion of credit to the 
private sector in the PIIGS countries. 
 
A “threshold method” for identifying credit booms, and the Granger causality test 
were applied to investigate the relationship between foreign capital inflows and the 
expansion of credit to the private sector in PIIGS countries. The data included in the 
analysis comes from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), the World 
Bank Global Financial Development Database, the European Central Bank, and the 
European Commission, and covers the period of 1996–2016. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the first part, a critical review of the literature 
on capital mobility and credit booms was conducted. The second section describes the 
research methods. This is followed by a discussion of the research results. The paper 
concludes with the most important research findings. 
 
2. Potential Benefits and Risks of Capital Mobility  
 
The potential benefits of the liberalisation of capital movements mainly result from 
the opportunity, available for households, enterprises, and governments, to raise funds 
on international financial markets under more favourable conditions than on the 
domestic market. The benefits include a reduced cost of capital for companies and 
governments, but also the creation of the opportunity to raise capital abroad in the 
event of a shortage of domestic capital. An opportunity is also created to make more 
profitable investments abroad than on the domestic market (Oręziak, 1999a; Levine, 
2001). In this way, the free movement of capital should support optimisation of capital 
allocation, i.e. the movement of capital to undertakings that are the most profitable 
(Feldstein, 2000). 
 
Using funds available on the international financial market is particularly popular 
among the developing countries, less economically developed ones and those 
undergoing economic transformation or affected by economic recession. All of them 
have relatively limited domestic capital resources. Wealthy and ageing societies have 
more savings; hence their countries often have a higher current account surplus. This 
surplus may be temporarily ‘made available’ to economies suffering from a shortage 
of funds (Fischer and Reisen,1992). The liberalisation of capital movements by such 
countries may contribute, in particular, to the inflow of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and thus, acceleration of economic growth and improvement of the society’s 
standard of living, if foreign capital is profitably invested from the point of view of 
the capital-importing country. The benefits of FDI include not only the inflow of 
funds, but also of new technologies, knowledge, new forms of production 
organisation, etc. FDI leads to a higher degree of competition on the market, which 
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domestic companies and better use of the available domestic resources (Loungani and 
Razin, 2001; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001; Havranek and Irsova, 2011; Hansen 
and Rand, 2006). 
 
Opening up to international capital transfers also stimulates the development of the 
domestic financial market. It is subject to strong competitive pressure from 
international financial institutions, which should support the process of strengthening 
and modernisation of domestic financial institutions (Fry, 1997). The benefits of the 
free movement of capital, enumerated in the literature, also include greater 
possibilities of diversification of investments for domestic and foreign investors, and 
stimulating governments to conduct a disciplined monetary and fiscal policy 
(Pierdzioch, 2004; Clark and Hallerberg, 2000). 
 
Empirical studies on recent crises (the Asian crisis, the global financial crisis, the 
PIIGS countries crisis) indicate that the abovementioned benefits from liberalisation 
of capital movements do not always occur in practice, or do occur, but to a limited 
extent (Herzer, Klasen and Nowak-Lehmann, 2008; Agosin and Machado, 2005). 
Capital is often directed for non-productive use (consumption—Greece, Portugal) 
(Fouskas and Dimoulas, 2013) or sectors with low productivity (Ireland, Spain) 
(Lains, 2008; Ó Riain, 2014; Dellepiane, Hardiman and Las Heras, 2013). Besides 
this, capital is often moved to the financial system of a given country (stock exchange, 
banking sector) and is of speculative character. The risk results from the ease and 
speed of making such transactions (or deposits) and withdrawing from them (Stiglitz, 
2000; Lane, 2013; Dailami, 1999; Demir, 2009; Thalassinos and Thalassinos, 2006). 
 
It has turned out that liberalisation of capital movements may bring not only benefits 
but also risks, in particular in case of less competitive countries as compared to the 
capital exporters (Janicka, 2008; Gabriele et al., 2000). A country which implements 
liberalisation of capital movements opens up to the impact of any external shocks. 
Foreign capital inflows may also have a destabilising effect on its economy (Stiglitz, 
2000). This is due to the fact that international capital flows can be quickly and 
strongly affected by both the economic situation of a given country and the situation 
in its close and distant environment. The negative consequences for the economy can 
be mainly caused by a sudden and mass outflow of capital. If the country has its own 
currency, this can sharply weaken its exchange rate. The investors dispose of assets 
denominated in the domestic currency and the sales revenue is usually transferred 
abroad. In order to prevent capital outflow, the need may arise to maintain the 
exchange rates at a relatively high level, which will surely have an impact on the 
internal economic competitiveness. The member states of a monetary union (such as 
the Eurozone countries), however, cannot respond to such shocks through their 
monetary policy instruments because they have been deprived of their own 
independent monetary policy and their own currency (Amri et al., 2016; Thalassinos 
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One of the main opponents of full liberalisation of capital movements is J.E. Stiglitz, 
co-author of asymmetric information theory. Stiglitz (2004) not only invalidates the 
main assumptions that provide the basis for the neoclassical theory which underlies 
the liberalisation processes, but also points out the impossibility of applying the 
conclusions from theories on the free movement of goods to the free movement of 
capital. A similar opinion is held by Rodrik (1998), who points out that “there is a 
fundamental difference in how the market functions in these two areas”. According 
to him, although commodity markets can hardly be considered as functioning in 
compliance with the neoclassical model, they are, to a large extent, effective and 
predictable. The financial markets are fundamentally different (they are characterised, 
e.g. by the asymmetric information phenomenon or the mismatch of maturity of 
liabilities, often short-term, and assets, often long-term). Therefore, any search for a 
common theoretical basis of the commodity and financial markets is groundless 
(Janicka, 2010). It should be noted, however, that J.E. Stiglitz is against full 
liberalisation of capital movement of a certain type, i.e. short-term capital flows. He 
claims that they contribute to destabilisation of financial markets, and in contrast to 
FDI, have no impact on improvement of the economic situation of the country which 
implements liberalisation. The increased risk of disturbances in its financial system is 
not compensated by the benefits of liberalisation. 
 
The arguments presented by Stiglitz (2000; 2004) are as follows: 
 
1) the theoretical assumptions underlying the liberalisation processes (inter alia 
informational efficiency of the financial market) are so idealistic that they are not 
reflected in reality; 
2) there is no conclusive evidence on the relationship between the degree of capital 
flow liberalisation and economic growth; 
3) the assumption that the country at the lower turning point of a business cycle will 
support domestic demand with foreign funds is incorrect because then the 
country’s creditworthiness will worsen and a natural behaviour of investors is to 
withdraw from such market (in particular from short-term investments); 
4) countries are encouraged to liberalise capital movements due to the fact that such 
opening should contribute to the expansion of their capital base. A frequent 
problem is, however, the transfer of capital abroad (e.g. to parent companies, i.e. 
foreign owners of enterprises and financial institutions). As a result, a depletion 
of the capital base of a given country can be observed; 
5) due to its high mobility, the inflow of short-term capital hinders the conduct of 
stable macroeconomic policy; 
6) liberation of capital movements, in the context of imperfect regulation of the 
financial market and weak supervision over the financial system, may lead to an 
outbreak of a currency crisis or a financial crisis. This argument was confirmed 
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It is worthwhile to emphasise that Stiglitz mainly analyses the risks resulting from 
capital inflows to a given country. The capital outflows threatening the stability are, 
according to him, a consequence of the previous episodes of excessive capital inflows. 
In the context of macroeconomic balance, liberalisation of capital movements 
generates specific risks in respect of (Molle, 2000; Janicka 2010): 
 
• a depletion of the domestic capital base, including stability of the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves; 
• more intense fluctuations in the foreign capital inflows to the domestic market; 
• disturbances in the process of achieving external and internal balance, among 
other things, through an impact on nominal and real exchange rates, and thus on 
the country’s competitiveness on the international market, and through an impact 
on the interest rate levels and interest on Treasury securities issued to finance the 
budget deficit and the public debt; 
• threats to the stability of the country’s financial system. 
 
The arguments raised by opponents of full liberalisation of capital movements can be 
mainly placed within Keynesian theory. They point out uncertainty as to the 
possibility to satisfy the investment needs of the country, or its ability to achieve 
external and internal balance regarding the liberation of capital movements. The key 
argument of the neoclassical theory, namely optimal capital allocation, has been 
denied. Optimal allocation works from the point of view of capital owners, rather than 
the country – the capital recipient. 
 
Particularly risky to the financial stability is the “hot” portfolio capital. It carries the 
following threats (Reisen and Soto, 2002; Boyd and Smith, 1992): 
 
• can significantly increase economic trend fluctuations, because it flows in broad 
streams during the economic boom periods (and in particular, a boom in the 
financial and real estate markets) and dries up at the time of a recession, 
• creates false economic incentives when it is easily available, 
• deprives of investment opportunities when it becomes scarce, 
• can destabilise the financial system, because its inflow leads to excessive lending 
expansion, and flight reduces asset prices, collateral value, and thus solvency of 
the banks, 
• can lead to speculative bubbles occurring in the markets of various assets, e.g. real 
estate, shares and bonds. 
 
3. Capital Flows as a Driver of Credit Booms 
 
As has already been shown, large capital inflows are among the main potential drivers 
of excessive sharp increases in credit to the private sector in emerging market as well 
as in advanced economies, next to such factors as: total factor productivity gains, 
financial reforms, fixed exchange rate regimes, low quality of financial institutions 
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Decressin and Terrones, 2011; Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012; Arena et al., 2015; Calderón 
and Kubota, 2012). 
 
A common feature of credit booms is the phenomenon of so-called capital bonanzas 
associated with the low price and availability of capital on international markets 
(Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008). Its inflow to the receiving country leads to a growth in 
consumption and investments, and thus GDP. Under boom conditions, the economy 
often develops beyond the production capacity, which is conducive to inflationary 
pressure and the loss of international price competitiveness through a nominal or real 
appreciation of the exchange rate. This may favour the allocation of funds in the non-
tradable sectors characterised by lower productivity, which further aggravates the loss 
of competitiveness. The real estate sector is this sector of the economy where foreign 
capital is often allocated (Tillmann, 2012). Capital inflows (often in the form of FDI) 
are conducive to price increases in this segment, accompanied by the so-called wealth 
effect, which also stimulates consumption and investments in the economy. At the 
same time, the conditions of easily available funds and economic growth may lead to 
the occurrence of expectations of further increases in the prices of houses and 
apartments, which provides incentives to increase demand. The price growth in the 
real estate market is due to the relatively long investment cycle, because of which 
growing demand is not equally quickly followed by supply (Amri et al., 2016). 
 
Keynesian theory, from which the optimal currency area (OCA) theory is derived, 
assumes that uncertainty about the future under the conditions of adaptability of 
expectations causes the alternate occurrences of optimistic and pessimistic 
expectations about the future economic trend. Such expectations become self-
fulfilling prophecies (De Grauwe, 2013). Optimistic (pessimistic) expectations about 
the future economic situation cause an increase (decrease) in consumption and 
investments, which improves (worsens) the economic situation. This calls for the need 
to conduct counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy. Similarly, Hyman Minsky, a 
representative of the post-Keynesian school, pointed out that adaptability of 
expectations gives rise to a trend that, in a period of economic upturn, banks are 
inclined to underestimate risks and take on risk on a larger scale, which from time to 
time leads to a serious bank crisis (Minsky, 1986). 
 
In contrast to Keynesian theory, the New Classical Synthesis (NCS), whose 
assumptions provided the basis for the structure of the Eurozone management system, 
makes the rational-expectations assumption. The adoption of such an assumption 
implies that the participants of economic life know the most probable course of future 
economic events and adapt their decisions thereto. In the world of NCS assumptions, 
there are no unstable credit booms as the rational-expectations assumption means that 
the participants of economic life contract only such amounts of loans that they will be 
able to repay out of their future incomes (Sławiński, 2015). 
 
The recent global financial crisis failed to confirm the adequacy of such assumptions. 
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occurred because of too optimistic expectations of households regarding the future 
economic trend, the level of their future incomes, and therefore, their ability to repay 
the contracted loans (Liapis et al., 2013). 
 
In the case of the Eurozone, an important factor that favoured the transfer of the 
financial crisis to the real sphere and, further, to the sphere of public finance, is the 
functioning of big pan-European banks (as a matter of fact, financial conglomerates) 
and re-orientation of these banks towards the granting of mortgage loans on a large 
scale. According to Sławiński and Tymoczko (2013), the big pan-European banks 
should be blamed for putting Europe in trouble. The unstable credit booms were 
largely financed from cross-border loans granted by these banks. In a situation where 
housing loans were financed by the banks from short-term interbank loans, their 
supply began to grow much faster than the GDP, which is faster than the households’ 
ability to repay them. This led to a debt crisis and recession resulting, among other 
things, from the fact that households were forced to repay housing loans which 
prevented them from affording other goods and services (Sławiński, 2015; 
Thalassinos et al., 2016; 2015). A consequence of the recession was fiscal crises in 
several countries participating in the EMU, which contributed to the so-called 
Eurozone crisis (Liapis et al., 2013). In the case of Greece, Portugal and Ireland, the 
fall in investors’ confidence in the solvency of their governments was so sharp that 
all three countries lost their ability to take out loans on the financial markets. These 
countries would have had to declare bankruptcy, had it not been for loans obtained 
from other Eurozone countries and the IMF. If the ECB had not announced that, if 
necessary, it would intervene on the Eurozone bond market, the governments of Spain 
and Italy would probably also have lost their ability to take out loans in the financial 
markets. 
 
Increased lending in the southern countries of the Eurozone was supported by the 
transfer of capital through the banking system from the northern and central countries, 
inter alia from Germany. This was an effect of operation of the previously mentioned 
big pan-European banks on the financial markets of the peripheral countries, which 
invested their surplus funds deposited by customers from the northern and central 
Eurozone countries. Another channel used for capital transfers were securities 
markets, in which the big pan-European banks also actively operated, offering their 
customers from the northern and central countries of the EMU, among other things, 
financial instruments through which funds were transferred to the economies (inter 
alia to the real estate market) and public budgets of the peripheral countries. Such 
transfers took place when the customers from the northern and central countries of the 
Eurozone were ensured higher rates of return on their invested funds in relation to the 
instruments financing the domestic economy or the domestic budget deficit. 
 
The process of economic and monetary integration in the EU, accompanied by 
liberalisation in the area of capital movements, led to a considerable reduction in the 
premium risk for less-wealthy member states and easing of barriers that limit lending 
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among other things, a feeling of increased wealth among households commonly 
believing that their future income would increase (Woreta et al., 2010). At least in 
some countries, this factor played the role of an important catalyst for the credit 
expansion. 
 
4. Data and Methods 
 
A credit boom, in general, is an episode characterised by an excessive, sharp increase 
in credit to the private sector that collapses because it becomes unsustainable in the 
short and medium term. A characteristic feature of this phenomenon is a higher 
growth rate of credit than during typical business cycle expansion (Mendoza and 
Terrones, 2008; Sa, 2006). 
 
A large number of studies have developed different approaches to identify credit 
booms. Their common feature is distinguishing a credit boom based on a comparison 
of the time course of a specific measure of credit (e.g. private credit to GDP ratio, real 
credit per capita) to its non-linear trend in a given country. A credit boom occurs when 
credit significantly exceeds (more than a given “boom threshold”) its long-run trend. 
The methods differ, however, in the details, e.g. whether the “boom threshold” is 
country-specific or which time-series filtering technique is used to separate a time 
series into trend and cyclical components (Gourchinas, Valdes and Landarretche, 
2001; Tornell and Westermann, 2002; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; 2012). 
 
In this study, we follow the approach developed by Mendoza and Terrones (2008; 
2012). It uses the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP filter) to split a credit time series (yt) 
into country-specific trend (τt) and cyclical components (ct) according to formula 














where: λ − a smoothing parameter, λ = 100 (value commonly used for annual data); 
t − time. 
 
The HP filter has become a standard method of detrending in the business cycle 
literature (Ravn and Uhlig, 2002), as it can be applied to nonstationary time series. 
The cyclical component in country i on date t is: ci,t = yi,t − τi,t, while (ci) denotes the 
standard deviation of the cyclical component in country i. A credit boom episode is a 
period (?̂?) in which credit exceeds its country-specific long-run trend by a critical 
(threshold) value: 
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ɸ – boom threshold factor. Following Arena et al. (2015), we used ɸ = 1.65 as it falls 
in the 5% tail of the standardised normal distribution. As a robustness check, we 
conducted a sensitivity analysis for a more stringent factor of ɸ=1.75 (Mendoza and 
Terrones, 2008). 
 
The duration of credit booms is calculated as: te − ts, where: 
ts – the starting date of the credit boom, such that 𝑡𝑠 < ?̂? and yields the smallest 
difference |𝑐𝑖,𝑡− 𝜑
𝑠𝜎(𝑐𝑖)|; 
te – the ending date of the credit boom, such that 𝑡𝑒 > ?̂? and yields the smallest 
difference |𝑐𝑖,𝑡− 𝜑
𝑒𝜎(𝑐𝑖)|; 
𝜑𝑠, 𝜑𝑒 – the starting and ending boom thresholds, respectively. Following Mendoza 
and Terrones (2008), we assumed that both the starting and ending thresholds are 
equal to one standard deviation of the cyclical component (𝜑𝑠= 𝜑𝑒=1). 
 
As a measure of credit, we use: 
Y1_cpc – real credit per capita: the logarithm of the sum of claims on the private sector 
by deposit money banks and other financial institutions (the end-of-year observation) 
deflated by the corresponding end-of-year consumer price index (CPI) in relation to 
population (data source: IMF International Financial Statistics); 
Y2_GDP – the logarithm of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions to GDP (data source: World Bank, The Global Financial Development 
Database). 
 
To establish the causality relationship between capital inflows and credit expansion 
to the private sector in PIIGS countries, the Granger causality test was used. Granger 
causality is based on the assumption that if, given the past values of y, past values of 
x are significant predictors of the current value of y, then x exerts a causal influence 
on y (Lopez and Weber 2017). According to Granger (1969), the following equation 
can be applied to test causal relationships between stationary time series (whether CF 
causes y): 
 
yi,t =α+ γ1y i,t-1 + ...+ γLy i,t-L+ β1CF i,t-1 + ...+ βLCF i,t-L+ ε i,t, (3) 
 
where: 
yi,t – expansions of credit to the private sector (measured as a growth rate of Y1_cpc or 
Y2_GDP) in country i at time t, 
CFi,t – measure of capital inflows to country i at time t. Capital inflows are measured 
as foreign liability flows: portfolio investment inflows (CF1) and alternatively as the 
total capital inflows (i.e. foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and other 
investments liabilities, CF2), in constant prices, using data from IFS. As several recent 
studies have highlighted substantial differences in the behaviour of gross versus net 
inflows (Amri et al., 2016; Forbes and Warnock, 2012), as a robustness check, we 
used both measures of capital inflows in net and gross terms; 
α, γ1 .., γL, β1, ...,βL – regression coefficients, 
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We estimated separate time-series regression equations for different credit and capital 
inflow measures. In order to determine the existence of causality, an F-test was 
performed, in which the null hypothesis assumes that all coefficients on the lags of 
variable CF (β1 to βL) are jointly zero (causality from CF to y does not exist). Due to 
the fact that the Granger test is sensitive to the number of lags that may affect the 
direction of causality (Gujarati, 2001), we included 1 to 3 lags in the estimations. 
Verification of the stationarity of the variables was performed using the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. 
 
It should be noted that the analysis covers a relatively short period, which entails 
certain limitations in drawing final conclusions. Furthermore, it neglects other 
macroeconomic and political reasons for the PIIGS countries to be more intensely 
exposed to the financial friction. It was assumed, though, that the study methods 
proposed are able to establish a short-term relationship between foreign capital 
inflows and the dynamics of credit to the private sector in the PIIGS countries, and 
thus allow the verification of the research hypothesis. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
 
From 1996 to 2007, the PIIGS countries experienced a very dynamic increase in 
private capital inflows to their economies (Figure 1). Significantly, until 2007, the 
capital inflows to these countries consisted mainly of investments in debt instruments 
and flows within the banking sector, while the capital inflow in the form of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) was less significant. 
 
Figure 1. Foreign capital inflows to PIIGS countries 
 
 
Source: Own study based on the IMF IFS database (https://data.imf.org/?sk=4C514D48-
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After 2007, the balance of capital flows in the PIIGS countries deteriorated. Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and Italy experienced a relatively sustained downward trend in foreign 
capital inflows. This was mainly due to a decrease in the inflow of debt portfolio 
investments and other financial investments into these economies. Among the PIIGS 
countries, Ireland was an exception to this rule, with a return to an upward trend of 
private foreign capital inflows to the economy after 2010. 
 
The dynamic growth of foreign capital inflow to the PIIGS countries at the beginning 
of the 21st century contributed to the reduction of risk premiums, reduction of real 
interest rates and easing of other barriers limiting lending to domestic business entities 
in these economies. As a result, the inflow of foreign capital to the PIIGS countries 
was accompanied by a dynamic increase in household and corporate debt (Figure 2). 
In 2009, the level of private debt as a share of GDP was on average around 136% of 
GDP in these countries, more than double the 1996 level (55% of GDP). Moreover, 
while in 2002 the private sector debt in the PIIGS countries was similar to the average 
in 12 Eurozone countries (80% of GDP), in 2009, it was already more than 30 
percentage points higher than the Eurozone-12 average (136% of GDP versus 112% 
GDP). 
 
Figure 2. Level and dynamic of private debt in Euro Area (12 countries) 
 
 
Source: Own study based on the IMF IFS database (https://data.imf.org/?sk=4C514D48-




An increase in the bank debt of the private sector (households and enterprises) 
expressed in relation to GDP was observed in the vast majority of the Eurozone 
countries (the only country which noted a decline in this type of debt was Germany) 
(Figure 3). The PIIGS countries, however, were distinguished by a greater increase in 
private credit among the euro area countries. The biggest increase in private sector 
debt was noted in Ireland as well as in Greece and Spain. In the latter country, the 
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i.e. in 1996, it was 69.7%. In Ireland, a rise from 67% in 1996 to 174% in 2009 was 
observed, in Greece – from 28% to 99%, respectively (The Global Financial 
Development Database). 
 
This was due to the fact that between 2002 and 2007, the average annual growth rate 
of private debt in the PIIGS countries was almost six times higher than in the other 
seven Eurozone-12 countries (Figure 2). Moreover, in the Eurozone-12 avarage as 
well as in PIIGS countries, the growth rate of credit to the private sector increased 
each year from 2002. In 2002, the average annual growth rate in the PIIGS countries 
was around 5%, but in 2008, it was already 12.5%. 
 
After 2008, there was a sharp credit crunch in all 12 Eurozone countries, with much 
deeper falls in the PIIGS countries. In this group of countries, the average annual 
private credit growth rate in 2008–2016 ranged from -9% to -1%. By comparison, in 
the remaining seven Eurozone countries, the private credit growth rate ranged 
between -3% and +1%. As a result, in 2016, the average private debt in the PIIGS 
countries reached a level similar to the average in the Eurozone (12 countries). 
However, this level was higher than the debt level at the beginning of the 21st century. 
In all Euro Area countries (with the exception of Germany), the average household 
debt in the period 2009–2014 was higher than the level observed before the financial 
crisis in the period 1999–2008. The highest level was noted in the Netherlands, which 
was closely followed by the countries most affected by the economic crisis (Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain). Moreover, the highest growth of average debt in the period 2009–
2014 in relation to the average level from before the crisis period was noted in Greece, 
followed by the other PIIGS countries (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Household debt in the selected Eurozone countries (average value for the 
periods 1999–2008 and 2009–2014) as % of GDP 
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Note: Calculations for boom threshold factor ɸ = 1.65. 
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After 2000, all PIIGS countries experienced above-average growth rates of private 
credit (proxy by Y1_cpc), which is characteristic of a credit boom (Figure 4).The PIIGS 
countries, however, differed due to the duration of the credit expansion and credit 
fluctuations during the peak period. In Greece, the credit boom occurred in 2006–
2011, with the peak of the credit boom in 2010. In Ireland, a period of above-average 
credit expansion occurred between 2005 and 2009, with the peak in 2007. In Italy, it 
was the period from 2006 to 2012, with peaks in 2007 and 2010, in Portugal – 2007–
2011 (2009 peak), and in Spain – 2006–2010 (2007 peak). After 2012, the level of 
credit was below the trend function values in all PIIGS countries. 
 
As a robustness check, we conducted a sensitivity analysis for a more stringent boom 
threshold factor of ɸ=1.75 (Mendoza and Terrones, 2008). This did not affect the 
above findings. The calculations were also carried out using another measure of credit 
Y2_GDP (private credit to GDP, calculation on request). The change in the credit 
measure resulted in a shift of the period of above-average credit growth rate by 2 years 
on average (t+2). Moreover, there were no confirmed peaks meeting the conditions 
of the credit boom for Italy, Portugal, or Spain. However, it should be borne in mind 
that the period of above-average credit expansion was identified by reference to a 
trend established on the basis of changes observed between 1996 and 2016. The 
analyses are therefore of a short-term nature. 
 
The presented data show that in the first decade of the 21st century, the period of 
dynamic inflow of foreign capital into the PIIGS countries co-occurred with a period 
of above-average credit growth. After 2008, both foreign capital inflows and credit 
collapsed. Furthermore, credit booms display some similarities across the PIIGS 
economies: they were similar in magnitude across these countries and followed surges 
in capital inflows. 
 
Countries that are members of the Eurozone are expected to have a stronger link 
between capital flow surges and credit booms since they cannot follow independent 
monetary policies (Amri et al., 2016). The Granger causality test was used to verify 
the occurrence of a cause-and-effect relationships between foreign capital inflows to 
the PIIGS countries and the occurrence of credit booms in those countries. The ADF 
test proved that both variables measuring the level of credits (Y1_cpc, Y2_GDP) and 
variables relating to foreign capital inflows (CF1 to CF4) are non-stationary and have 
a unit root (Table 1). Therefore, the growth rates of these variables were used to verify 
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Table 1. Results of ADF unit root test, p-value 
Specification Portugal Italy Ireland Greece Spain 
Y1_cpc - real credit per 
capita 
L 0.526 0.921 0.576 0.981 0.093 
FD 0.007 0.044 0.005 0.021 0.034 
Y2_GDP - credit to GDP L 0.125 0.773 0.526 0.472 0.251 
FD 0.001 0.038 0.036 0.001 0.009 
CF1 - gross portfolio 
investment (liabilities) 
L 0.689 0.152 0.148 0.963 0.466 
FD 0.001 0.0001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
CF2 - gross total 
capital flow(liabilities) 
L 0.279 0.322 0.520 0.906 0.467 
FD 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.001 
CF3 - net portfolio 
investment 
L 0.464 0.864 0.340 0.874 0.567 
FD 0.004 0.001 0.011 0.002 0.001 
CF4 - net total capital 
flow 
L 0.305 0.658 0.050 0.369 0.460 
FD 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.004 
Notes: L - level; FD - first difference.  
Source: Own study. 
 
Among the PIIGS countries, the closest cause-and-effect relationships between capital 
inflows and the level of credits per capita (Y1_cpc) were recorded in Greece (Table 2). 
For this country, all forms of capital inflows considered (CF1 to CF4) can be 
considered as a cause of credit booms in terms of Granger causality (p<0.05). These 
results do not depend on the number of lags included in the regression function but 
are sensitive to how credits are measured. In the case of Y2_GDP, the growth rate of 
credit to the private sector was mainly dependent on net capital flows. Both net 
portfolio flows (CF3) and net total capital flows (CF4) can be considered to be the 
cause, in terms of Granger causality, of the growth rate of credit to the private sector 
in that country (Y2_GDP). 
 
Table 2. Granger causality test results, p-value 
Country Lag 




















L1 - - - - - - - - 
L2 - - 0.094 - 0.003 - 0.079 - 
L3 - - - - - - - - 
Italy 
L1 0.021 - 0.032 - - - - - 
L2 0.098 - - - - - - 0.049 
L3 0.003 0.005 0.027 0.026 - - - - 
Ireland 
L1 - - 0.081 - - - - - 
L2 - - - - 0.077 0.095 - - 
L3 - - - - - - 0.020 - 
Greece 
L1 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.007 - 0.053 - 0.014 
L2 0.005 0.051 0.004 0.024 - - 0.056 0.065 
L3 0.023 0.044 0.004 0.002 - - 0.091 - 
Spain 
L1 - - - - - - - - 
L2 - - - - 0.098 - - - 
L3 - - - - 0.011 0.039 0.021 0.094 
Notes: Table shows only values meeting the condition of p<0.10. 
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Cause-and-effect relationships between capital inflows and credit per capita were also 
observed in Italy. For this country, the private sector credit growth rate (Y1_cpc) 
depended on capital inflows in the form of portfolio investment, both gross and net. 
The results, however, were sensitive to the use of another capital measure. For 
variable Y2_GDP only the impact of variable CF4 (net total capital flow) on credit 
growth was statistically significant. 
 
In Spain, no statistically significant links between capital inflows and credits 
measured using variable Y1_cpc were found. On the other hand, all forms of capital 
inflows can be considered as a cause in terms of Granger causality (taking into account 
a 3-year lag) for growth of credit measured in relation to GDP (Y2_GDP).In Portugal, 
only portfolio investment capital inflows can be considered as a cause of credit 
expansion (for variables Y1_cpc and Y2_GDP, taking into account a 2-year lag). A similar 
situation also occurred in Ireland. 
 
The results of the calculations indicate that in all PIIGS countries, the cause-and-effect 
relationship between the increase in foreign capital inflows and the increase in credit 
to the private sector was confirmed (Table 2). The results indicate that capital inflows 
can explain rapid credit growth in the PIIGS countries, which confirms the research 
hypothesis. These results are consistent with a number of empirical studies indicating 
that surges in capital inflow are a good predictor of rapid credit expansion in emerging 
as well as in advanced economies (Calderon and Kubota, 2012; Mendoza and 
Terrones, 2008; Amri et al., 2016). 
 
The results, however, are sensitive not only to the number of lags included in the 
regression function (which is an inherent feature of the Granger causality test), but 
also to the selection of measures representing credits and capital inflows. These 
conclusions are in line with observations by Amri et al. (2016) that the existence and 
strength of the links between foreign capital inflows and domestic credit dynamics 
depends on the way in which the measurement of both capital surges and credit booms 
is carried out. 
 
In terms of the composition of the inflows, the results of the calculations show the 
special role of capital inflows in the form of portfolio investments in the generation 
of credit booms in the Eurozone countries. It was confirmed that between 1996 and 
2016, capital inflows in the form of portfolio investments, both gross and net, in the 
PIIGS countries could be considered to be a cause of private sector credit growth in 
terms of Granger causality. Similarly, Furceri et al. (2012) found that surges in net 
portfolio and debt inflows have the largest effect on credit growth to the private sector. 
Lane and McQuade (2014) indicate that growth of credit (measured as a ratio to GDP) 
in a sample of European countries in 1993–2008 was positively correlated with large 
portfolio debt inflows. In general, net portfolio and debt investment stand out as the 
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6. Summary 
 
One of the causes of the Eurozone crisis was a rapid inflow of foreign capital and a 
large increase in lending in the peripheral countries, closing the development gap in 
relation to the central and northern EMU countries. An important role in this process 
was played by the free movement of capital and progressive integration of the 
financial market, which are key elements in the creation of an economic and monetary 
union. 
 
The growing household debt in Europe was an important driver of economic growth 
until 2007. On the other hand, the debt overhang, and the collapse in demand (as a 
result of the financial crisis followed by the economic crisis) were an important 
obstacle hindering the return to growth. Both the banks and the borrowers, to an 
insufficient extent, noticed and assessed the risk that the Eurozone economy (as well 
as the global economy) may enter a serious downward trend of the business cycle. 
That is why one of the lessons learned during the recent financial crisis is that 
excessive optimism associated with the expected future economic growth and the 
inflow to the financial market and the economy of ‘cheap’ and easily available capital 
lead to the occurrence of speculative bubbles, irrational and wrong investment 
decisions and over-indebtedness of households and enterprises. 
 
As a result of this lesson, changes are needed in the legal and market environment, 
associated with the sphere of providing the households and enterprises with access to 
bank loans and with the sphere of cross-border capital movements that would reduce 
the risk of subsequent excessive credit booms. Some institutional and legal changes 
in this respect have already been implemented, among others, in the field of EU 
legislation on responsible lending and borrowing. They are reflected in the review and 
amendments to directives on the loan market. This mainly applies to the Directive on 
credit agreements for consumers (Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008), as well as the directive on credit agreements 
for consumers relating to residential immovable property, generally referred to as the 
Mortgage Credit Directive (Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
2014/17/EU of 4 February 2014). In addition, the European Commission carries out 
assessments of legal regulations in terms of preventing the over-indebtedness of 
households. 
 
In order to ensure economic and financial stability in the Eurozone countries, 
especially the less competitive ones, it is also necessary to better identify the 
mechanisms linking the free movement of capital to the over-indebtedness of 
businesses and households. Further, in-depth analyses could include an investigation 
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